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VANASKIE, Circuit Judge.  
 
 Norman Stoerr was convicted of participating in an 
illegal bid rigging and kickback scheme in connection with 
his employment at Sevenson Environmental Services, Inc. 
(“Sevenson”).  Sevenson, a non-party to the underlying 
criminal proceeding, voluntarily compensated one of Stoerr‟s 
victims, Tierra Solutions, Inc. (“Tierra”).  At Stoerr‟s 
sentencing, Sevenson sought restitution under the Mandatory 
Victims Restitution Act (“MVRA”), 18 U.S.C. § 3663A et 
seq., for reimbursement of the amount that it paid as 
compensation to Tierra.  The District Court denied 
Sevenson‟s request for restitution, instead ordering that Stoerr 
pay restitution to Tierra.  Sevenson now attempts to appeal 
Stoerr‟s sentence, contending that the District Court erred in 
declining to grant its request for restitution.  We will dismiss 
Sevenson‟s appeal because, as a non-party, it lacks standing 
to appeal. 
 
I. 
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On July 23, 2008, Stoerr pled guilty to bid rigging, in 
violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1; conspiracy to provide kickbacks 
and to defraud the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
371; and assisting in the preparation of false tax returns, in 
violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(2).  The convictions stemmed 
from kickback payments that Stoerr solicited and accepted 
from sub-contractors in connection with projects managed by 
Sevenson, his employer from 1980 to October 2003. 
 
Sevenson obtained contracts in 2000 and 2004 with the 
United States Army Corps of Engineers to perform 
remediation services as the prime contractor at the Federal 
Creosote Superfund Site (“Federal Creosote”) in Manville, 
New Jersey.  From 1999 to 2007, Sevenson also had a 
contract with Tierra, a private company, to perform 
remediation services as the general contractor at the Diamond 
Alkali Superfund Site (“Diamond Alkali”) in Newark, New 
Jersey.  The Environmental Protection Agency was 
responsible for paying Sevenson for its services at Federal 
Creosote, and Tierra was responsible for paying Sevenson for 
its services at Diamond Alkali.  At both project sites, 
Sevenson hired sub-contractors, and then sought 
reimbursement from the payer for the sub-contractor charges, 
plus a fee equal to a fixed percentage of the sub-contractor 
charges.   
 
From 2000 to 2002, Stoerr was the superintendent at 
Diamond Alkali, and from 2002 to 2003, he was the assistant 
project manager/contracts administrator at Federal Creosote.  
At Diamond Alkali, Stoerr was responsible for soliciting 
vendors, and at Federal Creosote, he was responsible for 
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soliciting bids for sub-contracts.  In both positions, he 
reported to Gordon McDonald, the project manager. 
 
 From 2000 to 2004, Stoerr, at McDonald‟s direction, 
solicited and accepted kickbacks valued at $77,132 from sub-
contracting companies National Industrial, Inc. (“National 
Industrial”), JMJ Environmental Services, Inc. (“JMJ”), 
Bennett Environmental Inc., and Haas Sand & Gravel LLC.
1
  
In return for the kickbacks, Stoerr and McDonald treated the 
sub-contracting companies favorably in awarding sub-
contracts for the Federal Creosote and Diamond Alkali 
projects.   
 
Stoerr and McDonald passed the cost of the kickbacks 
on to Tierra and to the EPA by including the amount of the 
kickbacks in the sub-contractors‟ invoices that they submitted 
for reimbursement.  In total, the District Court determined 
that Stoerr‟s and McDonald‟s scheme resulted in losses of 
$134,098.96 to the EPA and $257,129.22 to Tierra.  Of the 
$257,129.22 in losses to Tierra, the District Court found that 
$25,000 related to kickback payments from National 
Industrial and its partial owner, Victor Boski, and 
$232,129.22 related to kickback payments from JMJ and its 
owner, John Drimak Jr.   
 
After Sevenson learned of the kickbacks scheme, it 
paid Tierra $202,759.04 to compensate it for its losses 
relating to the JMJ and Drimak scheme, and $38,158.11 to 
compensate it for its losses relating to the National Industrial 
                                              
1
 The kickbacks to Stoerr were in the form of money, 
tools, and a cruise. 
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and Boski scheme.  It then commenced a civil action against 
Stoerr in state court to recover its losses, and sought 
restitution in connection with Stoerr‟s sentencing. 
 
Regarding Stoerr‟s sentencing, Sevenson filed letters 
with the United States Probation Office and with the District 
Court, seeking restitution from Stoerr under the MVRA.  The 
MVRA “compels a sentencing court to order a defendant 
convicted of certain crimes, including crimes against 
property, to make restitution to his victim.”  United States v. 
Aguirre-Gonzalez, 597 F.3d 46, 51 (1st Cir. 2010) (emphasis 
omitted) (quoting United States v. Innarelli, 524 F.3d 286, 
292-93 (1st Cir. 2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  In 
particular, the MVRA provides that “[i]n each order of 
restitution, the court shall order restitution to each victim in 
the full amount of each victim‟s losses as determined by the 
court and without consideration of the economic 
circumstances of the defendant.”  18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(1)(A).  
The MVRA also provides that “[i]f a victim has received 
compensation from insurance or any other source with respect 
to a loss, the court shall order that restitution be paid to the 
person who provided or is obligated to provide the 
compensation.”  § 3664(j)(1).  Sevenson claimed that it was 
entitled to restitution because it reimbursed Tierra for its 
losses.
2
 
 
                                              
2
 Sevenson also initially sought restitution as a victim 
under the Crime Victims‟ Rights Act (“CVRA”), 18 U.S.C. § 
3771.  The CVRA, enacted in 2004, permits either the victim 
or the Government to assert the victim‟s rights before the 
district court under § 3771(d)(1).  Sevenson, however, does 
not pursue any claim under the CVRA in this appeal. 
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 On May 23, 2011, the District Court conducted 
Stoerr‟s sentencing, during which it denied Sevenson‟s 
request for restitution.  In declining to grant restitution to 
Sevenson, the District Court determined that Tierra, rather 
than Sevenson, was Stoerr‟s victim.  Moreover, the District 
Court noted that “Sevenson has the opportunity to pursue a 
civil remedy here.”  (A. 201.)   
 
The District Court sentenced Stoerr to a five-year 
period of probation and ordered restitution in the amount of 
$391,228.18, with $134,098.96 apportioned to the EPA and 
$257,129.22 apportioned to Tierra.  The District Court‟s order 
provided that Stoerr was jointly and severally liable for 
$232,192.22 of the Tierra payment with his co-conspirator, 
Drimak, whom the District Court had previously ordered to 
pay $232,192.22 in restitution to Tierra.  Because Stoerr 
lacked the financial ability to make the restitution payments 
in full, the District Court ordered him to pay $250 per month.   
 
On June 22, 2011, the District Court ordered that 
Stoerr‟s obligation to pay Tierra $25,000 for the losses 
relating to the National Industrial and Boski scheme was 
satisfied because “Tierra . . . received full compensation” for 
its losses stemming from that scheme.  (A. 173.)  The District 
Court also ordered that Sevenson‟s $202,759.04 payment to 
Tierra counted towards Stoerr‟s $232,129.22 restitution 
obligation relating to Tierra‟s losses from the JMJ and 
Drimak scheme, and reduced Stoerr‟s remaining restitution 
obligation to Tierra to $29,370.18. 
 
Sevenson moved for reconsideration of the District 
Court‟s restitution order, which the District Court denied.  
Sevenson then filed a notice of appeal.  The Government 
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moved to dismiss Sevenson‟s appeal, arguing that Sevenson, 
as a non-party, is unable to appeal Stoerr‟s sentence.  We 
referred the Government‟s motion to our merits panel and 
now consider the Government‟s motion together with the 
parties‟ merits briefs. 
 
II. 
 
 Sevenson contends that the District Court erred in 
failing to award it restitution in compensation for its 
payments to Tierra, because the MVRA requires district 
courts to order restitution to any entity that has compensated 
the crime victim.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3664(j)(1) (“If a victim has 
received compensation from insurance or any other source 
with respect to a loss, the court shall order that restitution be 
paid to the person who provided . . . the compensation . . . .”).  
Although Sevenson acknowledges that it is not a party to 
Stoerr‟s criminal proceedings, it asserts that it nonetheless has 
a right to appeal the District Court‟s restitution order as a 
non-party payer of compensation to a victim under the 
MVRA. 
 
The Government responds that Sevenson cannot 
appeal, because non-parties are unable to appeal a criminal 
defendant‟s final judgment and sentence.  The Government 
also contends that the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion in ordering restitution payments to Tierra rather 
than to Sevenson, because district courts must fully 
compensate victims for their losses under § 3664(f)(1)(A), 
and because Stoerr is jointly and severally liable for the 
$232,192.22 restitution payment with Drimak.  We will 
dismiss Sevenson‟s appeal, because Sevenson, as a non-party, 
lacks standing to appeal Stoerr‟s sentence. 
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A. 
 
To have standing to appeal, the appellant “must be 
aggrieved by the order of the district court from which it 
seeks to appeal.”3  IPSCO Steel (Ala.), Inc. v. Blaine Constr. 
Corp., 371 F.3d 150, 154 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting McLaughlin 
v. Pernsley, 876 F.2d 308, 313 (3d Cir. 1989)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Ordinarily, only parties to a 
                                              
3
 As the Supreme Court and our Court have 
emphasized, standing to appeal is a separate concept from 
standing under Article III of the Constitution.  See, e.g., 
Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 6-7 (2002); Deposit Guar. 
Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 333-34 (1980); IPSCO 
Steel (Ala.), Inc. v. Blaine Constr. Corp., 371 F.3d 150, 154 
(3d Cir. 2004).  A party has Article III standing if it satisfies 
the “case-or-controversy” requirement, whereas a party has 
standing to appeal if it “is aggrieved” by the district court‟s 
order or judgment.  IPSCO Steel (Ala.), Inc., 371 F.3d at 154.  
Although we suggested in McLaughlin v. Pernsley, 876 F.2d 
308, 313 (3d Cir. 1989), that the requirement that the 
appellant “be aggrieved by the” district court‟s decision 
“expresses the limitation imposed by Article III of the federal 
Constitution that one wishing to invoke the jurisdiction of a 
federal court have suffered an injury in fact,” the Supreme 
Court explained in Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. Roper 
that standing to appeal is a “rule . . . of federal appellate 
practice . . . derived from the statutes granting appellate 
jurisdiction and the historic practices of the appellate courts.”  
445 U.S. at 333.  The Supreme Court explicitly noted that “it 
does not have its source in the jurisdictional limitations of 
Art. III.”  Id. at 333-34. 
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proceeding adversely affected by the judgment entered in that 
proceeding are aggrieved by the judgment.  See Kaplan v. 
Rand, 192 F.3d 60, 66-67 (2d Cir. 1999) (“[I]f not a party, the 
putative appellant is not concluded by a judgment, and is not 
therefore aggrieved by it.”) (alteration and internal quotation 
marks omitted) (quoting West v. Radio-Keith-Orpheum Corp., 
70 F.2d 621, 624 (2d Cir. 1934)); Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. 
An-Car Oil Co., 604 F.2d 114, 119 (1st Cir. 1979) 
(“Ordinarily, only a person who was a party to the proceeding 
below and who is aggrieved by the judgment or order is 
entitled to appeal.”) (citations omitted); Burleson v. Coastal 
Recreation, Inc., 572 F.2d 509, 511 (5th Cir. 1978) (same).  
Accordingly, the Supreme Court and our Court have long 
recognized, as a general matter, that “only parties to a lawsuit, 
or those that properly become parties, may appeal an adverse 
judgment.”  Marino v. Ortiz, 484 U.S. 301, 304 (1988) 
(citations omitted); see also Karcher v. May, 484 U.S. 72, 77 
(1987) (“[W]e have consistently applied the general rule that 
one who is not a party or has not been treated as a party to a 
judgment has no right to appeal therefrom.”) (citations 
omitted); In re Leaf Tobacco Bd. of Trade, 222 U.S. 578, 581 
(1911) (“One who is not a party to a record and judgment is 
not entitled to appeal therefrom.”) (citations omitted); IPSCO 
Steel (Ala.), Inc., 371 F.3d at 153 (“Ordinarily, only parties of 
record before the district court have standing to appeal.”) 
(citing Caplan v. Fellheimer Eichen Braverman & Kaskey, 68 
F.3d 828, 836 (3d Cir. 1995)).   
 
Sevenson does not contest the fact that it is not a party 
to Stoerr‟s criminal proceeding.  Indeed, courts have 
recognized that “[n]otwithstanding the rights reflected in the 
restitution statutes, crime victims are not parties to a criminal 
sentencing proceeding.”  Aguirre-Gonzalez, 597 F.3d at 53 
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(citations omitted); see also United States v. Grundhoefer, 
916 F.2d 788, 793 (2d Cir. 1990) (explaining that “[t]he 
victim[,] as a non-party[,]” has only limited rights under the 
Victim and Witness Protection Act (“VWPA”), 18 U.S.C. § 
3663 et seq.).  Sevenson claims entitlement to restitution, not 
as a victim, but as one who has reimbursed losses incurred by 
a victim of its former employee.  If victims are non-parties to 
criminal proceedings, then Sevenson, who is a degree 
removed from victim status, is likewise a non-party.  The 
presumptive rule, therefore, is that Sevenson cannot appeal.  
See Aguirre-Gonzalez, 597 F.3d at 53 (“[T]he baseline rule is 
that crime victims, as non-parties, may not appeal a 
defendant‟s criminal sentence.”) (citations omitted). 
 
We find no reason to disturb the presumptive rule in 
the context of a non-party payer‟s appeal of a restitution 
order.  A restitution order is part of a defendant‟s sentence.  
See United States v. Syme, 276 F.3d 131, 159 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(“Restitution orders have long been treated as part of the 
sentence for the offense of conviction . . . .”) (citations 
omitted).  Thus, as the Tenth Circuit recognized, permitting a 
non-party to appeal a restitution order “would produce the 
extraordinary result of reopening [a criminal defendant‟s] 
sentence” for the benefit of a private party.4  United States v. 
Hunter, 548 F.3d 1308, 1314 (10th Cir. 2008).   
                                              
4
 Sevenson argues that permitting its appeal will not 
disturb Stoerr‟s final judgment and sentence, because it seeks 
only to “correct[] the payee” in the District Court‟s restitution 
order.  (Appellant‟s Resp. in Opp‟n to Mot. to Dismiss at 14.)  
Sevenson ignores, however, that it is asking us to alter the 
District Court‟s restitution award, which is part of Stoerr‟s 
sentence.  See United States v. Monzel, 641 F.3d 528, 541 
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Neither our Court nor any other Court of Appeals has 
ever permitted this result.  To the contrary, all Courts of 
Appeals to have addressed this issue have concluded that non-
parties cannot directly appeal a restitution order entered 
against a criminal defendant.  See, e.g., Aguirre-Gonzalez, 
597 F.3d at 54 (“[C]rime victims have no right to directly 
appeal a defendant‟s criminal sentence, under the CVRA or 
otherwise.”); Grundhoefer, 916 F.2d at 793 (holding that a 
victim lacks standing to appeal a restitution order); United 
States v. United Sec. Sav. Bank, 394 F.3d 564, 567 (8th Cir. 
2004) (holding that a crime victim lacks Article III standing 
to appeal under the MVRA); United States v. Mindel, 80 F.3d 
394, 398 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[A crime victim] does not have 
standing under the VWPA to challenge the district court‟s 
order rescinding restitution payments.”); Hunter, 548 F.3d at 
1316 (“[N]either our case law nor the CVRA provide[s] for 
non-parties . . . to bring a post-judgment direct appeal in a 
criminal case.”); United States v. Johnson, 983 F.2d 216, 217 
                                                                                                     
(D.C. Cir. 2011) (“[The victim] is asking the court to revisit 
her restitution award, which is part of [the defendant‟s] 
sentence.”) (citations omitted).  Moreover, Sevenson has 
requested that we vacate the District Court‟s order 
determining that Stoerr‟s restitution obligations of $25,000 
relating to the National Industrial and Boski scheme and 
$202,759.04 relating to the JMJ and Drimak scheme have 
been satisfied.  Granting Sevenson‟s requested relief will thus 
result in a much larger criminal restitution judgment.  
Because granting Sevenson‟s requested relief will 
dramatically alter Stoerr‟s restitution obligations, we disagree 
that we can grant Sevenson‟s request without disturbing 
Stoerr‟s final judgment and sentence.  
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(11th Cir. 1993) (holding that the VWPA “does not afford a 
victim . . . standing to appeal the rescission of a restitution 
order”); United States v. Monzel, 641 F.3d 528, 544 (D.C. 
Cir. 2011) (“[W]e hold that [a non-party appellant] may not 
directly appeal her restitution award . . . .”). 
 
We agree that a non-party lacks standing to appeal a 
restitution order, because a non-party lacks “a „judicially 
cognizable interest‟” in a criminal defendant‟s sentence, and 
is thus not aggrieved by the defendant‟s sentence.  
McLaughlin, 876 F.2d at 313 (quoting Diamond v. Charles, 
476 U.S. 54, 71 (1986)).  Although a restitution order may 
resemble a civil judgment in the sense that it compensates a 
private party, it remains “criminal rather than civil in nature.”  
United States v. Leahy, 438 F.3d 328, 335 (3d Cir. 2006) (en 
banc).  Criminal punishment “is not operated primarily for the 
benefit of victims, but for the benefit of society as a whole.”  
Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 52 (1986).  Therefore, 
regardless of the benefit that a restitution order may bestow 
on a private entity, restitution is largely “for the benefit of the 
State” rather than for the benefit of a private party.5  Id. at 53 
                                              
5
 Sevenson argues that our decision in United States v. 
Kones, 77 F.3d 66, 68 (3d Cir. 1996), requires us to conclude 
that non-parties have standing to appeal restitution orders, and 
that 28 U.S.C. § 1291 is a broad grant of jurisdiction over all 
final district court decisions.  In Kones, a purported victim 
sought to appeal the district court‟s conclusion that she was 
not entitled to restitution because she was not a “victim” 
under the VWPA.  77 F.3d at 68.  Without addressing the 
purported victim‟s standing to appeal, we noted in one 
sentence that we had appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1291.  Id.  A “drive-by jurisdictional ruling[],” in which 
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(quotation marks omitted).  Moreover, criminal prosecutions 
“place an individual citizen against the United States 
government.”  Hunter, 548 F.3d at 1312.  Accordingly, even 
if a defendant‟s sentence affects other individuals, “[i]t is the 
defendant and he alone that suffers the direct consequences of 
a criminal conviction and sentence.”  Grundhoefer, 916 F.2d 
at 791.   
 
Sevenson attempts to distinguish its appeal from the 
long line of precedent holding that a non-party lacks a 
judicially cognizable interest in a defendant‟s prosecution by 
arguing that the MVRA implies a right of appeal by non-party 
payers.  Sevenson also asserts that we have recognized 
exceptions permitting interested non-parties to appeal, and 
that such an exception should be made here.  We reject 
Sevenson‟s arguments in turn below. 
 
B. 
 
We first disagree that the MVRA‟s statutory scheme 
contains an implicit right of appeal by non-parties.  Citing 
                                                                                                     
jurisdiction “ha[s] been assumed by the parties, and . . . 
assumed without discussion by the [c]ourt,” does not create 
binding precedent.  Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 
523 U.S. 83, 91 (1998) (citations omitted).  We therefore are 
not bound by the bald jurisdictional statement in Kones.  
Moreover, 28 U.S.C. § 1291‟s broad jurisdictional grant does 
not permit us to ignore the requirement that the appellant 
have standing to appeal.  See United States v. Hunter, 548 
F.3d 1308, 1312 (10th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he issues of 
jurisdiction under § 1291 and non-party appellate rights are 
distinct.”). 
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United States v. Diaz, 245 F.3d 294, 312 (3d Cir. 2001), 
Sevenson contends that allowing standing here will further 
the purpose of the MVRA.  In Diaz, we recognized that “[t]he 
purpose of restitution under the MVRA is to compensate the 
victim for its losses and, to the extent possible, to make the 
victim whole.”  Id. (citing United States v. Kress, 944 F.2d 
155, 159-60 (3d Cir. 1991)).  The MVRA‟s statutory scheme, 
in Sevenson‟s view, encourages third-parties to compensate 
victims voluntarily by mandating reimbursement to the payer.  
See § 3664(j)(1) (“If a victim has received compensation from 
insurance or any other source with respect to a loss, the court 
shall order that restitution be paid to the person who provided 
or is obligated to provide the compensation . . . .”).  Because 
“preclud[ing] a pay[e]r from vindicating her right[] [to 
reimbursement] through the appellate process will . . . 
discourage or even deter would-be pay[e]rs from making 
victims whole,” Sevenson urges us to hold that the MVRA‟s 
statutory scheme contains an implied right of appeal by non-
party payers.  (Appellant‟s Resp. in Opp‟n to Mot. to Dismiss 
at 10.)   
 
Although we appreciate that conferring non-party 
payers with appellate rights may encourage third-parties to 
compensate victims voluntarily, we cannot conclude that the 
MVRA implies a right of appeal by non-parties.  First, the 
MVRA gives no indication that it disturbs the default rule that 
only the Government and the defendant can appeal a 
defendant‟s sentence.  Instead, as the Government explains, § 
3664(o)(1)(B) notes that a restitution order can be “appealed 
and modified” pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742.  Section 3742 
permits appeals by the defendant and by the Government, but 
does not purport to allow appeals by non-parties.  Because 
“[i]t is not the province of a federal court to confer rights 
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where statutory language is silent,” Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. 
Del. River Joint Toll Bridge Comm’n, 458 F.3d 291, 303 (3d 
Cir. 2006) (citing California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 
297 (1981)), the MVRA‟s omission of any language 
recognizing non-party appellate rights counsels against 
permitting non-party appeals.   
 
Moreover, we are especially hesitant to find an implied 
right of appeal by non-party payers under the MVRA, 
because Congress explicitly granted victims the right to 
petition the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus under the 
CVRA, but did not grant non-party payers an analogous 
means to obtain court of appeals review under the MVRA.  
See § 3771(d)(3) (permitting victims to petition for a writ of 
mandamus under the CVRA).
6
  Congress‟s decision to permit 
                                              
6
 Specifically, § 3771(d)(1) of the CVRA provides that 
“[t]he crime victim or the crime victim‟s lawful 
representative, and the attorney for the Government[,] may 
assert the rights” under the CVRA.  Section 3771(d)(3) 
explains that CVRA “rights . . . shall be asserted in the district 
court,” and “[i]f the district court denies the relief sought, the 
movant may petition the court of appeals for a writ of 
mandamus.”  As other courts have agreed, the CVRA thus 
allows victims to petition for a writ of mandamus.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Aguirre-Gonzalez, 597 F.3d 46, 54 (1st Cir. 
2010) (“[T]he CVRA expressly provides crime victims with a 
limited avenue to challenge the restitution component of a 
defendant‟s sentence through a petition for a writ of 
mandamus . . . .”) (citations omitted); Monzel, 641 F.3d at 
540 (“Since the enactment of the CVRA, every circuit to 
consider the question has held that mandamus is a crime 
victim‟s only recourse for challenging a restitution order.”). 
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victims to seek mandamus review under the CVRA, but to 
refrain from including a similar provision for non-party 
payers under either the MVRA or the CVRA, suggests that 
Congress did not intend to permit appeals by non-party 
payers. 
 
Finally, the MVRA‟s statutory scheme indicates that 
Congress intended for the Government, rather than for payers 
and victims, to be primarily responsible for ensuring proper 
restitution payments.  For example, the MVRA provides that 
“[t]he burden of demonstrating the amount of the loss 
sustained by a victim as a result of the offense shall be on the 
attorney for the Government,” § 3664(e) (emphasis added), 
and that “[a]n order of restitution may be enforced by the 
United States in the manner provided for in . . . [18 U.S.C. §§ 
3571 et seq. and 3611 et seq.]; or . . . by all other available 
and reasonable means.”  § 3664(m)(1)(A)(i)-(ii) (emphasis 
added).  A victim‟s role, by contrast, is limited to conferring 
with the Government “to the extent practicable” regarding the 
amounts of restitution, § 3664(d)(1); submitting information 
to the probation officer regarding his or her losses; § 
3664(d)(2)(A)(iii), (vi); petitioning the district court for an 
amended restitution award if he or she discovers further 
losses, § 3664(d)(5); moving for an adjustment of the 
defendant‟s payment schedule if the defendant‟s economic 
circumstances change, § 3664(k); and obtaining “an abstract 
of judgment certifying that a judgment has been entered in” 
his or her favor.  § 3664(m)(1)(B).  Because the MVRA‟s 
statutory scheme assigns to the Government the primary 
responsibility for ensuring proper restitution orders, we 
cannot infer from the MVRA that Congress intended to 
permit non-party payers to appeal purportedly improper 
restitution orders.  See Transamerica Mortg. Advisors, Inc. v. 
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Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19 (1979) (“[W]here a statute expressly 
provides a particular remedy or remedies, a court must be 
chary of reading others into it.”).  
 
We acknowledge, as Sevenson emphasizes, that the 
Sixth Circuit held in United States v. Perry, 360 F.3d 519, 
524 (6th Cir. 2004), that a victim has standing under the 
MVRA to appeal a district court‟s order vacating a lien that 
the victim obtained under § 3664(m)(1)(B) against a criminal 
defendant‟s property to collect court-ordered restitution.  We 
disagree, however, that Perry demonstrates that a non-party 
payer can appeal a criminal defendant‟s sentence.  In Perry, 
the Sixth Circuit reasoned that the MVRA permits a victim to 
obtain a lien to ensure that the defendant satisfies his or her 
restitution obligation.  Id.  A lien under the MVRA is “a lien 
on the property of the defendant located in such State in the 
same manner and to the same extent and under the same 
conditions as a judgment of a court of general jurisdiction in 
that State.”  Id. at 525 (quoting § 3664(m)(1)(B)).  In the state 
where defendant Perry‟s property was located, a lien gave rise 
to a property interest for the victim.  Id.  Because the lien 
created a property interest, the victim was entitled to due 
process before the district court vacated the lien.  Id. at 525-
26.  Out of concern that declining to hear the appeal would 
result in a deprivation of the victim‟s property without due 
process, the Sixth Circuit determined that the victim had 
standing under the MVRA.  Id. at 526.   
 
Sevenson, by contrast, cannot present the due process 
issue that the Sixth Circuit confronted in Perry, because it 
does not have a cognizable property interest created by state 
law.  We therefore do not face the constitutional concern that 
encouraged the Sixth Circuit to find that a victim has standing 
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to appeal a district court‟s order vacating a lien entered 
pursuant to § 3664(m)(1)(B).  Moreover, as the Government 
emphasizes, the victim in Perry did not request that Perry‟s 
final sentence be reopened.  We, by contrast, cannot review 
the District Court‟s restitution order without reopening 
Stoerr‟s sentence.  Perry thus does not persuade us that the 
MVRA affords standing to appeal to non-parties.
7
 
                                              
7
 Sevenson also cites to a letter from Senator Jon Kyl 
to Attorney General Eric Holder, in which Senator Kyl states 
that “when Congress passed the CVRA, the federal courts of 
appeals had recognized that crime victims could take ordinary 
appeals to protect their rights.”  Letter from Senator Jon Kyl 
to Attorney Gen. Eric Holder (June 6, 2011), reprinted in 157 
Cong. Rec. S3608 (daily ed. June 8, 2011).  In support of 
Senator Kyl‟s argument that victims were able to appeal to 
protect their rights at the time of the CVRA‟s passage, the 
letter cites to our decision in Kones, 77 F.3d 66 and to Doe v. 
United States, 666 F.2d 43, 46 (4th Cir. 1981), an appeal by a 
rape victim of a district court‟s pre-trial ruling relating to the 
admissibility of the victim‟s past sexual behavior and 
reputation at trial.  Id.  The letter continues that “Congress 
sought to leave these protections in place, while expanding 
them to ensure that crime victims could obtain quick 
vindication of their rights in appellate courts” through the 
CVRA‟s mandamus provision in § 3771(d)(3).  Id.  Senator 
Kyl‟s letter, however, does not persuade us that non-parties 
have a right to appeal under the MVRA, because the letter 
concerns the CVRA rather than the MVRA.  Additionally, a 
statement by an individual senator does not “amend the clear 
and unambiguous language of a statute,” Barnhart v. Sigmon 
Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 457 (2002), especially when the 
senator‟s statement follows long after the statute‟s enactment.  
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C. 
 
Next, Sevenson contends that the Supreme Court and 
our Court have recognized exceptions to the rule against non-
party appeals where the non-party has a pecuniary interest in 
the dispute.  See, e.g., Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 14 
(2002) (“We hold that nonnamed class members . . . who 
have objected in a timely manner to approval of the 
settlement . . . have the power to bring an appeal without first 
intervening.”); Caplan, 68 F.3d at 836 (holding in the civil 
context that a non-party with “a stake in the outcome of the 
district court proceedings” may sometimes appeal) (citing 
Binker v. Pennsylvania, 977 F.2d 738, 745 (3d Cir. 1992)).  
Because, in Sevenson‟s view, it has an interest in restitution 
under § 3664(j)(1), it asserts that it can appeal the District 
Court‟s restitution order as an interested non-party. 
 
As an initial matter, as Sevenson acknowledges, courts 
have allowed interested non-parties to appeal in primarily 
civil, rather than criminal, matters.  See, e.g., Devlin, 536 U.S. 
at 14 (permitting unnamed class members to appeal); Caplan, 
68 F.3d at 836 (holding in the civil context that certain non-
parties have a right to appeal); Northview Motors, Inc. v. 
Chrysler Motors Corp., 186 F.3d 346, 349 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(holding in the civil context that a non-party with “a stake in 
the outcome of the proceedings that is discernible from the 
record” can sometimes appeal) (citing Caplan, 68 F.3d at 
836).  Sevenson cites to no precedent in which the Supreme 
                                                                                                     
See Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 131 S. Ct. 1068, 1081 (2011) 
(“Post-enactment legislative history . . . is not a legitimate 
tool of statutory interpretation.”) (citations omitted). 
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Court or our Court has allowed an exception to the rule 
against non-party appeals in the context of a final criminal 
judgment.
8
 
 
                                              
8
 Sevenson argues that we may consider its appeal to 
be civil based on United States v. Lavin, 942 F.2d 177, 182 
(3d Cir. 1991), where we held that an appeal of a district 
court order rejecting a third-party‟s purported interest in 
forfeited property was a civil matter, even though the district 
court entered the initial forfeiture order as part of a criminal 
defendant‟s sentence.  We do not agree that Sevenson‟s 
appeal is civil in nature.  First, our Court has already 
concluded “that restitution ordered as part of a criminal 
sentence is criminal rather than civil in nature.”  United States 
v. Leahy, 438 F.3d 328, 335 (3d Cir. 2006) (en banc).  
Moreover, in Lavin, we reasoned that the appeal was civil in 
nature because “a hearing to adjudicate the validity of a third-
party‟s interest in forfeited property is not a criminal 
prosecution, i.e., an action commenced by the government to 
secure a sentence of conviction for criminal conduct.”  942 
F.2d at 182.  In particular, we explained that because the 
defendant had already forfeited the disputed property, 
reviewing the district court‟s rejection of the third-party‟s 
interest in the property would not affect the criminal 
defendant‟s rights.  Id.  Sevenson‟s request, by contrast, will 
substantively affect Stoerr‟s rights, because, as explained in 
note 4 supra, Sevenson asks us to vacate the District Court‟s 
order determining that all but $29,370.18 of Stoerr‟s 
restitution obligation has been satisfied.  Accordingly, 
because Sevenson asks us to materially alter Stoerr‟s 
sentence, its appeal is not civil.    
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Assuming that the exceptions permitting certain 
interested non-parties to appeal apply in the criminal context, 
none of our recognized exceptions permits Sevenson‟s 
appeal.  Our primary exception, known as the Binker 
exception, permits non-party appeals when “(1) the nonparty 
has a stake in the outcome of the proceedings that is 
discernible from the record; (2) the nonparty has participated 
in the proceedings before the district court; and (3) the 
equities favor the appeal.”  Northview Motors, Inc., 186 F.3d 
at 349 (citing Caplan, 68 F.3d at 836).  As we explained in 
Section II(A) supra, a non-party does not have a judicially 
cognizable stake in a criminal defendant‟s sentence.  
Sevenson therefore cannot satisfy the first prong of the Binker 
exception, and thus cannot establish entitlement to appeal as 
an interested non-party. 
 
III. 
 
 Because Sevenson does not have standing to appeal 
Stoerr‟s sentence, we will grant the Government‟s motion to 
dismiss.
9
 
                                              
9
 Because Sevenson lacks standing to appeal, we do 
not reach the question of whether the District Court abused its 
discretion in failing to award restitution to Sevenson. 
